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 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT  
ALVIN W-L SEE1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another2 has 
been invoked to rationalise the right to restitution in a number of cases which fall 
outside the provinces of contract and tort. This has eventually led to the recognition of 
an independent legal discipline known as the law of unjust enrichment. It is among 
the most debated private law subjects today despite its remarkably recent origin. In 
Malaysia, despite the increase in judicial reference to the language of unjust 
enrichment to justify an award of restitutionary relief, there is generally a lack of 
understanding about the subject and a failure to adopt a principled approach in its 
treatment. Therefore, it can hardly be said that Malaysia has a well-developed law of 
unjust enrichment, which is unfortunate given how frequently issues concerning 
unjust enrichment arise. This article seeks to address the problem by offering an 
introduction to the subject. The ensuing discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I 
(History) embarks on a journey through time, tracing the evolution of unjust 
enrichment from its beginning to its modern form. Part II (Taxonomy) examines the 
place of unjust enrichment within the general framework of private law and explains 
its differences with the more familiar disciplines such as contract and tort. Part III 
(Terminology), which flows from the discussions in Parts II and I, explains why it is 
                                                            
1 BCL (Oxford); CLP; LLB (Leeds); Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I 
The following abbreviations are used: JH Baker, ‘The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law’ in 
WR Cornish, Richard Nolan, J O’Sullivan and G Virgo (eds), Restitution: Past, Present & Future 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) p 37 (Baker, ‘History’); Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of 
Restitution (Oxford: OUP, 1985) (Birks, Introduction); Peter Birks, The Foundations of Unjust 
Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures (Wellington: Victoria U Press, 2003) (Birks, Foundations); Peter 
Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2005) (Birks, Unjust Enrichment); Andrew 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2011) (Birks, Unjust Enrichment); Charles 
Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8th edn, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) (Goff & Jones: Unjust Enrichment); DJ Ibbetson, A Historical 
Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford: OUP, 1999) (Ibbetson, Introduction); RM Jackson, 
The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1936) (Jackson, 
History); Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2006) 
(Virgo, Restitution); Percy H Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Law (Cambridge: Harvard U 
Press, 1925) (Winfield, Sources); Percy H Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U Press, 1931) (Winfield, Province). 
2 This principle made early appearances in Justinian’s Digest (6th century AD) in two texts attributed 
to the Roman scholar Pomponius. See Digest, 12.6.14: ‘Nam hoc natura aequum est neminem cum 
alterius detrimento fieri locupletiorem’ (‘For this is by nature fair that nobody should be enriched by 
another’s loss’); Digest, 50.17.206: ‘Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et 
iniuria fieri locupletiorem’ (‘It is fair according to the law of nature that nobody should be enriched by 
loss and injustice to another’). Translated: Birks, Unjust Enrichment, at p 268. 
 important to speak of unjust enrichment instead of restitution. Part IV (Lessons) 
explains why the discussions in Parts I to III matter today. Lastly, Part V (Future) sets 
out certain themes that should inform future works on this subject. The last two parts 
will focus on the Malaysian context. 
 
PART I: HISTORY  
Although restitutionary relief was available under medieval English law for a variety 
of situations, the medieval lawyers were generally unconcerned about whether these 
situations could be rationalised by some unifying principle and be coalesced into an 
independent legal discipline.3 The neglect of principle was largely attributed to the 
contentment in finding an accepted legal formula within which the claims could fit. 
The practical lawyers had no need to turn their minds to the conceptual bases that 
underlie their claims. Procedure suppressed principle. 
An attempt to fill this conceptual void was not made until the mid-eighteenth century. 
In the celebrated case of Moses v Macferlan,4 Lord Mansfield spoke of an action to 
recover money which ‘ex aequo et bono’5 (according to equity and good conscience) 
or ‘by the ties of natural justice and equity’ the defendant ought to refund.6 The action 
was said to lie:  
… for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; 
or for money got through imposition, (express, or implied;) or extortion; or 
oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to 
laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances.7 
Lord Mansfield’s judgment was afforded the first thorough treatment in Evans’ 
extended essay on the action for money had and received published in 1802.8 He 
                                                            
3 See Baker, ‘History’, at pp 37–56; Jackson, History, at pp 1–36; Ibbetson, Introduction, at pp 265–68; 
David Ibbetson, ‘Unjust Enrichment in England before 1600’ in Eltjo JH Schrage (ed), Unjust 
Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1995) p 121.  
4 (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at p 1012.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid at pp 1008, 1012. See also Sadler v Evans (1766) 4 Burr 1984 at p 1986; Clarke v Shee and 
Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp 197 at pp 199–200; Towers v Barrett (1786) 1 Term Rep 133 at p 134; Jestons 
v Brooke (1778) 2 Cowp 793 at p 795. 
7 (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at p 1012. See also Isaak Mattos v Parker (1756) LI Harrowby MS doc 17 at p 
35: ‘Wherever money paid by mistake, fraud, deceit or extortion without consideration, the law makes 
it money to the use of the payer’.  
8 William David Evans, ‘An Essay on the Action for Money Had and Received’ in William David 
Evans, Essays on the Action for Money Had and Received, on the Law of Insurances, and on the Law 
of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Liverpool: Merritt & Wright, 1802) p 1.  
 accepted Lord Mansfield’s list of situations in which the action would lie, to which he 
added money paid under an illegal contract. The maxim ‘Hoc naturâ aequum est, 
neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri locupletiorem’9 was invoked to justify the use 
of the action in these cases.10 
Despite these attempts to explain the conceptual basis that underlie the right to 
restitution in these cases, no independent subject was born. Instead, most of these 
cases became subsumed within the province of the law of contract.11 In order to 
understand this phenomenon, it is necessary go further back in time.  
About two-thirds of the law of unjust enrichment was of common law origin and 
these fell under the rubric of quasi-contract.12 The term ‘quasi-contract’ was derived 
from the phrase ‘quasi ex contractu’ used in Roman law. The Romans initially (in the 
second century AD) classified civil obligations into those arising either ex contractu 
(from contract) or ex delicto (from wrong).13 But it was realised that some obligations 
arose from neither (eg obligation to repay a mistaken payment),14 thus resulting in the 
creation of a separate category of obligations arising ex variis causarum figuris (from 
various other causes).15 Later, in the sixth century AD, this miscellaneous category 
was split into obligations arising quasi ex contractu (as though from contract) and 
quasi ex delicto (as though from wrong).16 While obligations that arise from lawful or 
non-wrongful conducts were commonly contractual, it was recognised that the 
contractual sphere was not exhaustive of such obligations. The residue was thus 
slotted into the category of obligations arising quasi ex contractu,17 which were 
sanctioned in much the same way as obligations arising ex contractu.18 Importantly, 
                                                            
9 For translation, see n 2 above.  
10 William David Evans, ‘An Essay on the Action for Money Had and Received’ in William David 
Evans, Essays on the Action for Money Had and Received, on the Law of Insurances, and on the Law 
of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Liverpool: Merritt & Wright, 1802) p 1 at p 5. See also his 
other works: William David Evans, A General View of the Decisions of Lord Mansfield in Civil 
Causes, vol II (London: J Butterworth, 1803) at p 200; R Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 
or Contracts, William David Evans (trans) (London: Joseph Butterworth, 1806), vol I, at pp 69–70; vol 
II, at pp 378–81. 
11 For some early examples, see Samuel Comyn, A Treatise of the Law Relative to Contracts and 
Agreements Not Under Seal, vol II (London: J Butterworth, 1807) at ch 1; Joseph Chitty, A Practical 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not Under Seal (London: S Sweet, 1826) at s V3; Stephen Martin 
Leake, Elements of the Law of Contracts (London: Stevens and Sons, 1867) at ch I s I §2. 
12 Birks, Introduction, at p 29. Although quasi-contractual obligations did not all arise from unjust 
enrichment, the bulk of them did. Most works on quasi-contract dealt only with the unjust enrichment 
aspect of it.  
13 Gaius, Institutes, 3.88.   
14 Gaius, Institutes, 3.91.   
15 Digest, 44.7.1 pr. (Gaius, 2 Aurea). 
16 Digest, 44.7.5 (Gaius, 3 Aurea); Justinian, Institutes, 3.13.2.  
17 Birks, Introduction, at pp 30–31. 
18 Ibid.  
 the Romans clearly did not regard such obligations as based on contract. As Birks 
explained, ‘[i]f Gaius himself did coin the phrase ‘quasi ex contractu’ it is as certain 
as anything could be that he meant to emphasise that there was no contract’.19  
Roman law had some influence on the laws of ancient England.20 This was apparent 
in the second systematic treatise on English law written by Henry of Bracton in the 
thirteenth century.21 Of interest is Bracton’s adoption of the fourfold classification of 
obligations by the Romans.22 But this Roman influence was destined to be short-lived. 
The rise of the forms of action during the reigns of Henry III (1216–1272) and 
Edward I (1272–1307)23 turned the attention away from the systematic exposition of 
the laws to a focus on procedures.24 It is accurate to describe the laws and procedures 
of medieval England as being inseparably intertwined.25 Baker explained:  
The learning about writs, forms of action and pleading was fundamental to the 
old common law … because the procedural institutions preceded the 
substantive law as it is now understood. The principles of the common law 
were never mapped out in the abstract, but grew around the forms by which 
justice was centralised and administered by the king’s courts. There was a law 
of writs before there was a law of property, or of contract, or of tort.26   
                                                            
19 Birks, Foundations, at p 16.  
20 See generally Thomas Edward Scrutton, The Influence of the Roman Law on the Law of England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1883); Winfield, Sources, at ch IV; TFT Plucknett, ‘The Relations 
Between Roman Law and English Common Law Down to the Sixteenth Century: A General Survey’ 
(1939) 3 U Toronto LJ 24; Paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (London and NY: 
Harper, 1909) at ch IV.  
21 Henrici de Bracton, De Legibus et Confuetudinibus Angliæ (Of Laws and Customs of England) (c. 
1210 to 1268). Most of Bracton’s Roman materials were derived indirectly from the Corpus Juris 
through the work of Azo of Bologna. On the extent to which Bracton’s work was influenced by Roman 
law, see Thomas Edward Scrutton, The Influence of the Roman Law on the Law of England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1883) at ch III; Frederick William Maitland, Selected Passages From 
the Works of Bracton and Azo (London: B Quaritch, 1895); Frederick Pollock and Frederick William 
Maitland, The History of English Law, vol I (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1895) at ch VI; George E 
Woodbine, ‘The Roman Element in Bracton’s De Adquirendo Rerum Dominio’ (1922) 31 Yale LJ 
827; WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd edn (Rewritten), vol II (London: Methuen & Co, 
1923) at pp 267–286; Paul Vinogradoff, ‘The Roman Elements in Bracton’s Treatise’ (1923) 32 Yale 
LJ 751; SE Thorne, Essays in English Legal History (London: Hambledon Press, 1985) at ch 8. 
22 De Legibus et Confuetudinibus Angliæ, at ff 100–101. 
23 See generally AH Chaytor and WJ Whittaker (eds), FW Maitland, Equity, also the Forms of Action 
at Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1910) at pp 314–346. 
24 However, it may be that some forms of action had Roman influence. See Birks, Foundations, at p 13. 
25 This was also an era of books about legal practice. As Winfield observed: ‘[N]early every effort at 
legal literature had been obscured by a dense cloud of procedure. Most of the books seem to answer the 
question, ‘What must I do in Court?’ rather than, ‘What is the law?’ They are like printed instructions 
hung up in the engine-room of a factory rather than manuals on the science of engineering’ (Winfield, 
Sources, at p 311).  
26 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2nd edn (London: Butterworths, 1979) at p 49. 
See also Baker, ‘History’, at p 40 (‘In such a legal world, practice was necessarily in advance of settled 
 Despite this, the Roman phrase ‘ex quasi contractu’ still found its way in English law. 
To see how it did, it is necessary to study the forms of action, which until the mid-
nineteenth century substantially influenced the development of the common law. 
These are best understood as legal formulas which the plaintiff’s pleading must 
confirm to. 
The sixteenth century saw the creation of a new form of action, the action of 
assumpsit, which became an attractive alternative to the older actions of debt and 
account.27 The plaintiff who brings an action of assumpsit asserts that the defendant 
made a promise (assumpsit) to pay but broke it. It was in form an action for damages 
for breach of a promise.28 In Slade v Morley, the plaintiff who sought to recover the 
price due under a sale was allowed to use assumpsit as an alternative to the action of 
debt, which was previously not allowed.29 Where so used, it was known as indebitatus 
assumpsit. The indebitatus assumpsit rested on the assertion that the defendant, being 
indebted to the plaintiff for a certain sum (indebitatus), and in consideration thereof, 
promised to repay it (assumpsit) but failed to do so. Once the debt was proven, 
however, no separate proof of promise was required.30 It was implied, and not 
traversable.31 On actual facts, the defendant in Slade v Morley made no (subsequent) 
promise to repay. As Baker explained, ‘the promise to pay was no doubt almost 
always fictitious, for it was generally accepted that this was essentially a claim of debt 
forced into the assumpsit formula by the addition of an imaginary promise’.32 
However, despite the fictional promise, there was no doubt that the plaintiff’s claim 
was essentially contractual.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
law, and propositions of law took root in advance of speculative explanations’); Sir Henry Sumner 
Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (NY: Henry Holt & Co, 1886) at p 389 (‘So great is 
the ascendency of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at 
first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only 
see the law through the envelope of its technical forms’). 
27 In an action of debt, for example, the defendant was usually entitled to wage the law, ie to make an 
oath that he did not owe the plaintiff the amount, and if a number of persons (usually eleven or twelve) 
swore that they believed him, the plaintiff’s claim will be defeated. See Ibbetson, Introduction, at p 32 
28 Baker, ‘History’, at p 39. See also JB Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit’ (1888) 2 Harvard L Rev 2. 
29 (1602) 4 Co 92b at p 94a. See also JH Baker, ‘New Light on Slade’s Case’ (1971) 29 Cambridge LJ 
51 at p 213; David Ibbetson, ‘Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context’ (1984) 4 
Oxford J Legal Studies 295. 
30 Birks, Foundations, at p 13. 
31 Jackson, History, at p 44. 
32 Baker, ‘History’, at p 42. See also JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn 
(London: Butterworths, 2002) at p 348: ‘No one was in any doubt that the courts had allowed the forms 
of law to be twisted so that the transactions represented by the common counts could be enforced 
without resort to an action of debt. That had been the object of the majority in Slade’s Case’. 
 The courts subsequently extended the use of assumpsit to cases involving non-
contractual claims in the latter half of the seventeenth century.33 The action for money 
had and received, a sub-form of indebitatus assumpsit, became the chief method by 
which unjust enrichment claims were brought. The action could be briefly pleaded as 
follows:  
Being indebted in such a sum as so much money had and received to the 
plaintiff’s use, in consideration thereof the defendant afterwards promised to 
pay, yet he wickedly broke that promise.34  
Here the cause of the defendant’s indebtedness was pleaded as money had and 
received to the plaintiff’s use, which means money received on the plaintiff’s 
behalf.35 The exact details of the claim (eg the plaintiff has paid the defendant by 
mistake) do not appear on the face of the action and would be dispensed with until 
trial.36 At trial, the plaintiff would adduce certain facts to substantiate the allegation. 
As to what facts the court would accept as sufficient to show that the defendant 
received the money on the plaintiff’s behalf, Lord Mansfield had provided the answer 
in Moses v Macferlan: payments made under mistake or duress, or for a consideration 
that has failed, etc.37 On establishing any of these, the law would imply a promise.  
To justify such an extension of assumpsit, Lord Mansfield said: 
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to 
refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the equity of 
                                                            
33 On the use of indebitatus assumpsit for unjust enrichment claims, see JB Ames, ‘The History of 
Assumpsit’ (1888) 2 Harvard L Rev 53 at pp 63–69; Winfield, Province, at pp 123–28; Jackson, 
History, at pp 39–117; JH Baker, ‘The Use of Assumpsit for Restitutionary Money Claims 1600–1800’ 
in in Eltjo JH Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of 
Restitution (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995) p 31; Ibbetson, Introduction, at pp 269–73; William 
Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol XII (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at ch VIII.  
34 Birks, Foundations, at p 14. See also Birks, Unjust Enrichment, at p 287; AH Chaytor and WJ 
Whittaker (eds), FW Maitland, Equity, also the Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U Press, 1910) at p 385.  
35 Birks, Foundations, at p 14. 
36 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at p 1010: ‘One great benefit, which arises to suitors from the 
nature of this action, is, that the plaintiff needs not state the special circumstances from which he 
concludes “that, ex æquo & bono, the money received by the defendant, ought to be deemed as 
belonging to him:” he may declare generally, “that the money was received to his use;” and make out 
his case, at the trial’. See also JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn (London: 
Butterworths, 2002) at p 373: ‘This gave the plaintiff a considerable advantage when compared with 
special assumpsit, in which all material details had to be shown’. 
37 Judges normally decided the matter off the record. See Birks, Foundations, at p 49; Baker, ‘History’, 
at pp 40–42. See also Isaak Mattos v Parker (1756) LI Harrowby MS doc 17 at p 35. 
 the plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract (‘quasi ex contractu,’ as the 
Roman law expresses it).38  
Birks described this as ‘the brilliant and dangerous attempt to kill two birds with one 
alien stone, the appeal to the Roman phrase quasi ex contractu which seeks both to 
justify the action’s form and to affirm its non-contractual nature’.39 The reference to 
‘quasi ex contractu’ was only necessary to give the cases a contractual cloak to justify 
the use of indebitatus assumpsit.40 There is clearly no contract, for a mistaken 
payment is recoverable by indebitatus assumpsit although the mistaken payee did not 
actually promise to repay it.41 Everyone knew that the promise was a fiction.42 
The action of money paid to the defendant’s use was another sub-form of indebitatus 
assumpsit.43 The alleged cause of the defendant’s indebtedness was money paid, laid 
out and expended for the defendant at his special instance and request. The law will 
imply both the request and the promise to pay on the proof of certain facts, eg where 
the plaintiff paid money to a third party under compulsion or necessity from which 
the defendant derived a benefit.44 
Two other sub-forms of assumpsit were quantum meruit (as much as he deserved) and 
quamtum valebat (as much as they were worth).45 These were ordinary actions of 
assumpsit (not indebitatus assumpsit, since they do not allege a debt) alleging the 
breach of a promise to pay a reasonable sum for a service or goods requested by the 
defendant, respectively.46 While quantum meruit and quantum valebat were used 
                                                            
38 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at p 1008.  
39 Birks, Introduction, at p 36. 
40 Ibid at p 63.  
41 One of the earliest cases in which assumpsit was used to recover a mistaken payment was Lady 
Cavendish v Middleton (1628) Cro Car 141. 
42 See Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 at p 62: ‘Lord 
Mansfield does not say that the law implies a promise. The law implies a debt or obligation which is a 
different thing. In fact, he denies that there is a contract; the obligation is as efficacious as if it were 
upon a contract’ (per Lord Wright). The fiction was in fact recognised much earlier: R Pothier, A 
Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts, William David Evans (trans), vol I (London: Joseph 
Butterworth, 1806) at Introduction p 85; Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1861) at 
pp 343–44; Stephen Martin Leake, Elements of the Law of Contracts (London: Stevens and Sons, 
1867) at pp 39–40; Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity (London: Stevens 
and Sons, 1876) at p 29; William R Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1879) at pp 321, 324; AH Chaytor and WJ Whittaker (eds), FW Maitland, Equity, 
also the Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1910) at p 364. 
43 See generally Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1966) at pp 3–4, 29–31; Birks, Unjust Enrichment, at pp 287–88; Baker, ‘History’, at pp 44–46; 
Ibbetson, Introduction, at pp 269–272; William Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England, vol XII (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at pp 598–600. 
44 See eg Exall v Patridge (1799) 8 Term Rep 308. 
45 See generally Baker, ‘History’, at pp 42–44, 46–48. 
46 See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, at p 287. 
 mostly in situations where the promise to pay could properly be inferred from an 
existing contract, they could also apply in non-contractual situations, eg where the 
plaintiff performed services or delivered goods pursuant to a contract which did not 
materialise or was void. Again, the promise to pay, and in some cases the request, was 
implied.  
Unfortunately, the courts were already referring to quasi or implied contracts as early 
as the beginning of the eighteenth century.47 Such terminologies are misleading. The 
term ‘quasi-contract’ suggests that the action is in substance contractual although its 
only similarity with contract was the form in which the claims could be brought. Birks 
complained: 
‘Quasi-contract’ sounds like ‘sort of contract’. However hard the impression is 
combated, the image is of matter barely tolerated on the fringe of contract … 
The Latin is a bit safer: quasi ex contractu means ‘as though upon a contract’, 
and fairly obviously implies that there is none. But the English noun cannot be 
turned away from its false overtone.48  
The term ‘implied contract’ fared no better since what was implied was a promise, not 
a contract.49 By the time Moses v Macferlan was decided, Blackstone, the first 
Vinerian Professor of English Law, was already lecturing on quasi-contracts at 
Oxford.50 Due to his fondness for the social contract and the influence of civilian 
scholarship, he explained those cases identified by Lord Mansfield as based on 
implied contract.51 This view was clearly set out in his Commentaries published 
shortly after, which contained the first academic citation of Moses v Macferlan.52 
Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Moses v Macferlan was cited verbatim,53 albeit in 
                                                            
47 See eg Jacob v Allen (1703) 1 Salk 27; Cock v Vivian (1734) W Kel 203.  
48 Birks, Introduction, at p 34. See also Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1861) at p 
344: ‘This word ‘quasi,’ prefixed to a term of Roman law, implies that the conception to which it 
serves as an index is connected to which it serves as an index is connected with the conception with 
which the comparison is instituted by a strong superficial analogy or resemblance. It does not denote 
that the two conceptions are the same or that they belong to the same genus’. 
49 Ibbetson, Introduction, at p 272: ‘the courts had moved from the wholly accurate proposition that 
these actions were based on implied promise to the wholly inaccurate proposition that they were based 
on implied contracts’. 
50 Ibid at p 273. 
51 Peter Birks and Grant McLeod, ‘The Implied Contract Theory of Quasi-Contract: Civilian Opinion 
Current in the Century Before Blackstone’ (1986) 6 Oxford J Legal Studies 46.  
52 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1768) at pp 161–65.  
53 Ibid at p 162. 
 support of a proposition that deviated from what Lord Mansfield originally 
intended.54  
The forms of action were finally abolished in the mid-nineteenth century.55 However, 
the fiction of implied contract grew rather than diminish in importance for some time 
thereafter. It seemed immortal. 56  In 1914, the House of Lords in Sinclair v 
Brougham57 stubbornly maintained that the common law recognised only two classes 
of obligations: contractual and tortious.58 It explained quasi-contractual claims as 
referring to claims which ‘in theory is based on a contract which is imputed to the 
defendant by a fiction of law’.59  More importantly, the court said that ‘[t]he fiction 
can only be set up with effect if such a contract would be valid if it really existed’.60 
The case involved depositors of an ultra vires banking business who sought to recover 
their money on the basis of money had and received. It was held that they could not 
because the contracts of deposit were void. Lord Sumner explained: 
To hold otherwise would be indirectly to sanction an ultra vires borrowing. All 
these causes of action are common species of the genus assumpsit. All now 
rest, and long have rested, upon a notional or imputed promise to repay. The 
law cannot de jure impute promises to repay, whether for money had and 
received or otherwise, which, if made de facto, it would inexorably avoid.61 
The fictitious contract was treated as giving rise to matters of substance.62 Ironically, 
the same argument would have been rejected if raised in a medieval court.63 
It is not difficult to guess why the court in Sinclair v Brougham continued to resort to 
the implied contract theory. Judges of that time were reluctant to accept Lord 
                                                            
54 Ibid at p 161. The implied contract theory was also adopted by Blackstone’s successors: Thomas M 
Curley (ed), Robert Chambers, A Course of Lectures on English Law Delivered at the University of 
Oxford 1767–1773, vol II (Oxford: OUP, 1986) at p 224; Richard Wooddeson, A Systematic View of 
the Laws of England, as Treated in a Course of Vinerian Lectures, vol II (London: T Payne, 1792–93) 
at p 158. 
55 Common Law Procedure Act 1852. 
56 AH Chaytor and WJ Whittaker (eds), FW Maitland, Equity, also the Forms of Action at Common 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1910) at p 296: ‘The forms of action we have buried, but they 
still rule us from their graves’. 
57 [1914] AC 398.  
58 Ibid at p 415 (per Viscount Haldane LC).  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid at p 452. See also Re Simms [1934] Ch 1. 
62 See also WS Holdsworth, ‘Unjustifiable Enrichment’ (1939) 55 LQR 37 at pp 47–48: ‘But some of 
these pleading fictions have made substantive law, and the changes made in the law of pleading have 
not got rid of the substantive law which they have made … I maintain that the fiction that the remedy 
for unjustifiable enrichment was based on a contract has given rise to the rule of substantive law’. 
63 See Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at p 1008; Arris v Stukely (1677) 2 Mod 260 at p 262. 
 Mansfield’s references to conscience, natural justice and equity as the bases for 
imposing a duty to make restitution. These notions were regarded as being too 
vague.64 The alternative is to look for analogy with contract, an established concept. 
Some two decades before Sinclair v Brougham, Pollock explained: 
In many cases where duties resembling those created by contract are imposed 
by law (where in Roman terms there is obligation quasi ex contact), they are 
such as it is considered that a just man, on being fully informed of the facts, 
would in the circumstances willingly assume. The most familiar example in 
this kind is the duty of returning a payment made by mistake.65 
From this it was inferred that some contractual rules should also apply to quasi-
contracts. Holdsworth explained: 
Thus, although the contract implied is a fictitious contract because there is no 
consent, the liability is so analogous to a contract that some of the rules 
relating to a true contract must be applied to determine whether in the 
circumstances it is possible to impose it. In other words, the question whether 
the enrichment is unjustifiable depends partly upon whether it is fair and right 
that the defendant should repay, and partly upon whether the relations of the 
parties are such that it is legally possible to imply a contract. The analogy to a 
contract, which is indicated by the word ‘quasi-contract’, is thus logically 
made part of the test which determines in what circumstances it is possible to 
give a remedy for unjustifiable enrichment.66 
However, once it is recognised that the supposed affinity between contract and quasi-
contract was a historical accident, the logic of drawing an analogy between the two 
collapses. As Winfield expressed, ‘[i]t is not merely that in them the analogy is faint; 
there is no analogy at all’.67 The conceptual difference between contract and unjust 
enrichment will be considered in more detail in Part III. 
It shall be noticed that Lord Mansfield also made references to equity and relied on 
the notion of conscience in his treatment of the common law action for money had 
                                                            
64 See Part III below. 
65 Frederick Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence (London: Macmillan & Co, 1896) at p 89. He most 
probably had in mind Chapter V of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (see Part IV below).  
66 WS Holdsworth, ‘Unjustifiable Enrichment’ (1939) 55 LQR 37 at p 42. See also HG Hanbury, ‘The 
Recovery of Money’ (1924) 40 LQR 31. 
67 Winfield, Province, at p 119. See also Jackson, History, at p 129 ‘The essence of contract has thus 
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 and received.68 It was thus posited that he borrowed from equity to advance the 
common law action.69 The contrary view is that he was simply referring to ‘aequitas’, 
a Latin term used in Roman law to signify equity in the non-technical sense of natural 
justice or fairness.70 However, in either case, he was clearly dealing with a common 
law money count which only entitled the plaintiff to monetary restitution. In 
Longchamp v Kenny,71 Lord Mansfield said: ‘It is certain, that, where the demand is 
for a specific thing, an action cannot be maintained in this form’.72  
However, Equity, too, has important contributions to the law of unjust enrichment. 
The Chancery granted restitutionary relief in cases involving mistake, fraud, innocent 
misrepresentation, undue influence, exploitation of weakness, failure of purpose, 
etc.73 More importantly, it allowed a variety of restitutionary remedies: account, 
rescission, constructive or resulting trust, subrogation, equitable lien, etc. 74 
Unfortunately, without a unifying label as its common law counterpart had, unjust 
enrichment in equity fell on the wayside.  
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Legal History of the Law of Restitution (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995) p 289 at pp 314–16; 
Ibbetson, Introduction, at p 272; Tariq A Baloch, Unjust Enrichment and Contract (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009) at pp 35–37. 
70 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127 at p 137: ‘It is further clear that the equity to which he 
was referring is not ‘an equity’ in the sense in which it was used in the Court of Chancery … Lord 
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71 (1778) 1 Doug 137.  
72 Ibid. See also Nightingal v Devisme (1770) 5 Burr 2589. 
73 Ibbetson, Introduction, at pp 273–75. 
74 See Ibbetson, Introduction, at pp 273–76; Birks, Unjust Enrichment, at pp 292–307. 
 Besides the jurisdictional divide, the rise of the implied contract theory also broke the 
link between quasi-contract and its equitable counterpart. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, judges began to steer away from references to conscience and equity, 
preferring fictions over vague notions. The common law and equitable aspects of 
unjust enrichment did not meet until much later.75 
Across the Atlantic things were more encouraging—at least in the beginning. The 
blurry images of the modern law of unjust enrichment began to emerge from a series 
of Harvard Law Review articles in the late nineteenth century. Keener, in his 1887 
article, explained a person’s right to recover money paid away under mistake as based 
on the principle that ‘[o]ne shall not be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the 
expense of another’.76 Ames, in his 1888 article, wrote more generally that ‘the great 
bulk of quasi-contracts’ were based on the principle that ‘one person shall not unjustly 
enrich himself at the expense of another’.77 The principle of unjust enrichment also 
informed Keener’s subsequent works, which include the subject’s first casebook78 and 
more importantly its first treatise in 1893 (A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-
Contracts).79 Ames was commonly credited for inspiring Keener in the production of 
these works.80 Following closely were a number of casebooks by various authors81 
and the second treatise by Woodward in 1913.82 While retaining the label of quasi-
contract, these works made clear that the cause of action was not based on contract 
but on the principle of unjust enrichment. None of them, however, provided a full 
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76 William A Keener, ‘Recovery of Money Paid Under Mistake of Fact’ (1887) 1 Harvard L Rev 211.  
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78 William A Keener, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Quasi-Contracts, vols I and II (NY: Baker, 
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82 Frederic Campbell Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1913). 
The concept of misreliance, which the book was based on, was derived from JH Wigmore, ‘A 
Summary of Quasi-contracts’ (1891) 25 American L Rev 695. The latter, interestingly, was written 
during the Professor Wigmore’s stay in Tokyo, Japan.  
 account of the subject since they do not deal with equity’s contributions to the 
subject.83 
The real breakthrough came in 1937 when the American Law Institute (ALI) 
published its first Restatement of the Law of Restitution (hereinafter Restatement),84 of 
which Seavey and Scott were the Reporters.85 The subject matters of the Restatement, 
which came under the new label ‘Restitution’, were based on the principle that ‘A 
person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make 
restitution to the other’ (§1). Part I, titled ‘Quasi Contracts and Kindred Equitable 
Relief’, dealt mainly with the grounds for allowing restitution and the remedy of 
monetary restitution. Part II, titled ‘Constructive Trusts and Analogous Equitable 
Remedies’, dealt specifically with three equitable restitutionary remedies: 
constructive trust, equitable lien and subrogation. Both parts overlap and the principle 
of unjust enrichment cuts across the traditional divide between law and equity. The 
significance of receiving equity into the family was that proprietary relief became 
available. 
However, despite the celebrated breakthrough and subsequent efforts to advance the 
subject,86 the flame for some reason ‘flickered and almost went out’.87 As early as the 
1960s restitution departed from most American law school curriculums to occupy 
only a part of more standard courses on contracts, property and remedies.88 The exact 
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 reason is difficult to pinpoint, but it was said that much was owed to ‘the realists’ 
scorn for legal doctrine’.89  
Fortunately, the dimming torch was passed back to a now more receiving end of the 
Atlantic.90 The decision of Sinclair v Brougham had sparked a renewed interest in the 
efforts to identify what truly underpins the subject. In the latter half of the 1930s, the 
satisfactoriness of the implied contract theory began to be widely questioned by both 
the courts91 and scholars.92 By the early 1940s the courts began to explicitly denounce 
the implied contract theory. In United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd,93 Lord 
Atkin said:  
These fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to meet 
requirements of the law as to the forms of action which have now disappeared 
should not in these days be allowed to affect actual rights. When the ghosts of 
the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper 
course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.94  
Similarly, in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd, Lord 
Wright commented95 ‘[Lord Mansfied] denies that there is a contract; the obligation is 
as efficious as if it were upon a contract. The obligation is a creation of the law, just 
as much as an obligation in tort’.96  
The first English scholar of this period to embrace the principle of unjust enrichment 
was Winfield.97 In The Province of The Law of Tort published in 1931, he devoted a 
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 lengthy chapter exploring quasi-contracts. 98  Clearly influenced by American 
jurisprudence,99 he wrote:  
There must always be circumstances which make one man civilly liable to 
another on grounds reducible neither to contract nor tort. The principle that 
‘one person shall not unjustly enrich [preferably ‘benefit’] himself at the 
expense of another’ must penetrate any system of law. That principle is at the 
root of all genuinely quasi-contractual relations.100 
The 1938 issue of the Law Quarterly Review was also especially important. It 
contained a detailed explanation of the Restatement by Seavey and Scott101 as well as 
a favourable review of the Restatement by Winfield. 102  These exposed the 
Restatement to a wider English and Commonwealth audience, paving the way for a 
more ready reception of the principle of unjust enrichment. 
Lord Wright, in his review of the Restatement, regarded it as ‘an admirable model’ 
from which the English lawyers could produce a ‘reasoned treatise on the subject’.103 
His Lordship also took advantage of his judicial capacity to promote the principle of 
unjust enrichment. Most noteworthy was his attempt to do so in the Fibrosa case in 
1943: 
It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for 
cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to 
prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derive from 
another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in 
English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and 
are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which 
has been called quasi-contract or restitution.104 
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 Unfortunately, the Second World War interrupted legal progress. Post-war, two little 
books on quasi-contract were published.105 But it was not until some two decades 
later that Lord Wright’s call was answered. In 1966, Goff (later Lord Goff) and Jones 
(later Professor Jones) published their pioneer work, The Law of Restitution.106 As 
what would later become known simply as Goff & Jones, the book gathered together 
all the cases that triggered restitutionary responses and showed that they were 
founded on the principle of unjust enrichment. 107  Determined to abandon the 
traditional constraints, the authors made clear in the book’s preface:  
 [T]he law of Restitution is the law relating to all claims, quasi-contractual or 
otherwise, which are founded on the principle of unjust enrichment … We 
have cast our net very wide. Our account cuts across the boundaries which 
traditionally separate law from equity. We have included topics from such 
diverse fields as, for example, trusts, admiralty, and many branches of 
commercial law; and we have considered proprietary as well as personal 
claims. Indeed, it is our belief that only through the study of Restitution in its 
widest form can the principle underlying the subject be fully understood.108 
They explicitly rejected the implied contract theory, describing it as ‘a meaningless, 
irrelevant and misleading anachronism’.109 
Then, in 1985, Birks published his modestly titled but unquestionably seminal book, 
An Introduction to the Law of Restitution. Although preceded by two editions of Goff 
and Jones, it offered, among other things, a fuller and more detailed discussion of the 
elements of unjust enrichment and, importantly, its relations with the other branches 
of the private law. As Birks himself said, it was not a textbook, but rather one that 
was ‘pre-occupied with the task of finding the simplest structure on which the 
material in Goff and Jones can hang’.110 It provided the much needed conceptual 
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 framework and structural coherence for the subject upon which many subsequent 
works were based. His works marked the beginning of the modern era of the law of 
unjust enrichment and a modern trend of private law scholarship.111 
In sharp contrast to its earlier neglect, unjust enrichment has become the most debated 
private law subject.112 The last two and a half decades witnessed the most remarkable 
scholarly achievements in the area of private law. There are now a number of leading 
textbooks113 and even a Restitution Law Review (RLR) dedicated to its exploration. It 
has finally, albeit belatedly, come of age. On the American side, the flame is starting 
to reignite following the ALI’s recent publication of the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.114  
While the development of the subject was initially driven by academic discourse (it 
still largely is today), it was the positive receipt by the judiciary that turned theory 
into reality. If there were still doubts about whether English law recognised an 
independent law of unjust enrichment (and indeed there were),115 the matter was 
finally put beyond question in 1991 when the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd116 gave its judicial blessing by recognising a claim for restitution based 
on unjust enrichment. Some of the other Commonwealth jurisdictions were in fact 
ahead on this measure.117 Later, in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
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2006). For more concise works, see Charles Mitchell, ‘Unjust Enrichment’ in Andrew Burrows (ed), 
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 LBC,118 the House of Lords explicitly rejected the implied contract theory adopted in 
Sinclair v Brougham.119 Since then, the number of case law dealing with unjust 
enrichment and referring to its proper name proliferated.  
A number of lessons could be derived from this historical introduction.120 First, we 
must stop using the language of the forms of actions. They hinder rather than aid 
understanding. Second, the older authorities must be read in their historical contexts. 
The references to (quasi) contract were a product of judicial innovation to extend the 
reach of certain forms of action. It is now accepted that the implied contract theory is 
flawed and that the principle of unjust enrichment underlies much of the cases 
previously falling under quasi-contract. Provided that we keep a keen eye, the older 
authorities remain useful for they continue to supply the materials for the study of the 
subject. 
 
PART II: TAXONOMY 
In 1925, Winfield wrote: ‘One of the vices of the Common Law, or, for that matter, 
the whole of English Law, is its appalling bulk’.121 That was only six decades since 
the beginning of official law reporting. As the amount of legal materials that we deal 
with today is far greater, the classification of law, also known as legal taxonomy, 
assumes greater importance. It is necessary to organise the body of law in a manner 
that facilitates accessibility and understanding.122 
The earlier attempts at arranging the law are unsatisfactory by today’s standard. Take 
for example Charles Viner’s Abridgment published in the mid-eighteenth century.123 
In twenty-two volumes, he arranged numerous legal titles in alphabetical order, 
beginning with ‘Abetment’ and ending with ‘Year, Day and Waste’. Other amusing 
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 titles include ‘Blood Corrupted’, ‘Deaf, Dumb and Blind’, ‘Deer-Stealing’, ‘Funeral 
Charges’ and ‘Negative Pregnant’. This seems like a massive collection of arbitrarily 
chosen titles. There is no connection between one title and its preceding or subsequent 
titles. If one wishes to know all that the law has to say about contract, it would be 
necessary to scan through all twenty-two volumes to pick up the relevant bits. 
Winfield thus rightly suggested: 
[T]he abridgment might take the form of connected exposition by various 
experts who would include enough of the history of the topics with which they 
were concerned to make them intelligible from a modern point of view; and 
that the whole might be indexed on the alphabetical principle. Lawyers would 
still be able to find their law, and to find it with some appreciation of its unity 
and without being jerked by a philological accident from the first volume to 
the twentieth. 124 
He probably had in mind Lord Halsbury’s The Laws of England published between 
1907 and 1917. The titles contained in volume I of the first edition are as follows: 
action; admiralty; agency; agriculture; aliens; allotments; animals; arbitration; auction 
and auctioneers; bailment; bankers and banking.125  
The more popular approach today is to arrange the law into even broader topics such 
as contract, tort, land, trusts, family, company, etc. This approach is best reflected in 
how textbooks are written and also in the law school curriculums. Essentially, each 
topic consists of what the law has to say about a particular area of human activity. 
Company law and family law draw together all the law relevant to families and 
companies, much as contract law draws together the law about contracts.126 This 
method of arranging the law is known as contextual classification.127 
Contextual classification, while practical and useful, has been thought to be 
inadequate in facilitating clear legal thought. At the conceptual level, the 
classification often conceals overlaps between the topics and the absence of unity of 
concept within the topics themselves. For example, the vitiating factors that are 
studied under contract law (eg mistake, misrepresentation, duress and undue 
influence) are not strictly speaking contractual concepts.128 They are included in the 
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125 Earl of Halsbury, The Laws of England: A Complete Statement of the Whole Law of England, vol I 
(London: Butterworths, 1907). 
126 Peter BH Birks, ‘Restitution and the Freedom of Contract’ (1983) 36 141 at p 146. 
127 Birks, Introduction, 73–74.  
128 Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at p 315: ‘insofar as they cannot be 
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 study of contract because they impact on the validity of a contract. The same vitiating 
factors also impact on the validity of trusts and other voluntary dispositions, and 
therefore belong also to those subjects. Lawyers who focus rigidly on contextual 
classification are bound to overlook the fact that these vitiating factors, which share a 
conceptual basis, could form a topic of their own. These are the main unjust factors in 
the law of unjust enrichment. While contextual categorisation will remain useful in 
practice, conceptual categorisation must permeate legal thought.  
At a practical level, the overreliance on contextual classification gives rise to what 
Birks called the ‘stovepipe mentality’.129 He gave the analogy of lawyers who know 
the law ‘only in the way that many people know London, as pools of unconnected 
light into which to emerge from a limited number of friendly tube stations’.130 These 
stovepipe lawyers see the law simply as ‘a list of topics, heaped up in any order’ or ‘a 
list of courses taken at law school’.131 They cannot see the connection between one 
topic and another. This is unfortunate, for as human activities become more complex, 
the same facts often give rise to overlapping issues from the different branches of the 
law. 
The solution is to redraw the boundaries. The topics must be rearranged according to 
concepts, not contexts. Such conceptual classification would invariably cut across the 
traditional contextual categories of the law. According to Birks, the private law is best 
structured in terms of events and responses.132 Borrowing from and varying the 
Roman approach, he introduced what is later known as the ‘Birksian grid’.133 It is an 
event-based classification which focuses on legally significant events to which the 





                                                                                                                                                                          
on contract law principles. This means that (true) excuse rules are not concerned with determining 
either the existence or the content of a contract. Excuse rules impose external limits on validity created 
contractual rights. Their origins are therefore found outside the law of contract as strictly defined’. 
129 Peter Birks (ed), English Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000) at pp xxxv–xxxvi.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Peter Birks, ‘Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13’ in Peter Birks (ed), The 
Classification of Obligations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p 2 at p 2. 
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Restitution 1 6 11 16 
Compensation 2 7 12 17 
Punishment 3 8 13 18 
Perfection 4 9 14 19 
Other goals 5 10 15 20 
 
The Birksian grid has not been judicially endorsed and is not free from criticisms.134 
For one thing, it does not present a complete picture of the law. ‘Other events’, for 
example, is not one but numerous categories of events. Obvious examples include 
events that trigger the law’s imposition of tortious duties such as duty of care, duty 
not to trespass, duty not to defame, etc.135 Also, the concept of property and the 
primary-secondary obligations dichotomy do not feature in the grid.136 Nonetheless, 
the classification is at least useful for demonstrating the independence of unjust 
enrichment. This is achieved by explaining the differences between the contents of 
boxes 1, 6 and 11 of the grid.  
The most familiar manifestation of consent is a contract. If I lent you $50 on the 
condition that you repay it on the following Monday, my right to the repayment arose 
from our mutual consents which underpinned the contract of loan. Unlike the Roman 
classification, however, consent here is pitched at a higher level of generality than 
contract. It includes also other manifestations of consent such as a gift and a 
declaration of trust.137 For example, if I hand you a book and tell you to hold it on 
trust for me, my right to demand for the book arises from my declaration of trust and 
your acceptance of the trusteeship. 
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137 Peter Birks, ‘Misnomer’ in Cornish et al, Restitution: Past, Present & Future, p 1 at p 8. 
 A wrong is simply a breach of duty or obligation.138 It is pitched at a higher level of 
generality than tort, allowing the inclusion of other conceptually identical events such 
as equitable wrongs (eg breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of 
confidence)139 and breach of contract.140 This event is best explained using the 
primary-secondary dichotomy of duties or obligations. In Photo Production Ltd v 
Securicor Transport Ltd,141 Lord Diplock explained the nature of the obligation to pay 
damages for breach of contract: 
Every failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of contract. The 
secondary obligation on the part of the contract breaker to which it gives rise 
by implication of the common law is to pay monetary compensation to the 
other party for the loss sustained by him in consequence of the breach …142 
The ‘primary obligation’ was in reference to what the contract breaker undertook to 
perform under the contract, which arose from the event of consent. The breach of 
such primary obligations amounts to a wrong and this triggers a secondary obligation, 
usually to make monetary compensation. 
Unjust enrichment, in contrast, is neither consent-based nor wrong-based. The general 
principle of unjust enrichment is converted into applicable rules and principles mainly 
by reference to a four-stage inquiry:143 (a) Is the defendant enriched? (b) Is it at the 
plaintiff’s expense? (c) Is it unjust? and (d) Is the claim barred or limited by some 
defence or policy consideration? If (a) to (c) are answered in the affirmative, the 
plaintiff will have a prima facie right to restitution. The burden then shifts to the 
defendant to raise a defence. If the defendant fails to do so, the prima facie right to 
restitution crystalises into an absolute one. 
It is only necessary here to focus on question (c). Despite the resonance of 
wrongfulness in the word ‘unjust’, it does not refer to any breach of duty or fault. 
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 Neither is the right to restitution determined by a discretionary subjective evaluation 
of what amounts to unjust enrichment. In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd,144 Lord 
Goff said: ‘The recovery of money in restitution is not, as a general rule, a matter of 
discretion for the court. A claim to recover money at common law is made as a matter 
of right’.145 Under the prevailing common law approach, the ‘unjust’ inquiry is 
determined by reference to an established list of factors that the law recognises as 
calling for restitution. 146 These ‘unjust factors’ may be divided into two large 
categories: intent-based and policy-based.147 The former category, which focuses on 
the absence of or defects in the plaintiff’s subjective intention to benefit the 
defendant, includes lack of consent, mistake, duress, undue influence and failure of 
consideration. It is in this category that some unity of concept could be found, 
providing a justification for why unjust enrichment should be treated as an 
independent subject. The latter category, however, lacks such unity.148  It consists a 
disparate list of situations in which certain policy considerations demand restitution, 
such as in the cases of necessity, compulsory discharge of another’s debt, ultra vires 
receipts and payments by public bodies, etc. The list of unjust factors is not 
exhaustive and is capable of incremental expansion.149 This unjust factors approach 
steers us away from approaching the unjust inquiry by reference to arbitrary and 
open-ended notions such as equity, conscience, fairness and natural justice, which do 
not provide sufficiently certain criteria for application.150  
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 In Kelly v Solari,151 an insurance company mistakenly paid out to a widow on a 
lapsed policy. The court held that, unless at retrial the jury was to find that the 
company was not actually mistaken or was indifferent as to whether the money was 
correctly paid out, the widow must repay the money. The causative event is not 
consent. The widow did not agree to repay the money, hence the dispute. To regard 
her as having agreed, when in fact she did not, will be to subscribe to the fiction of 
implied contract or promise, which we have strongly warned against. Neither did she 
commit a wrong by accepting the mistaken payment. The law does not (although it 
could) impose a primary duty not to receive mistaken payment or to retain it. If such a 
duty is to be imposed at all, then logically some fault element must be required on her 
part. She must, for example, have known that the company was mistaken at the time 
of receipt. But the widow’s duty to repay the money was not premised on her 
knowledge (if any) of the company’s mistake.152 It did not matter what she did or 
what she knew. The duty arose immediately upon her receipt of the money. Although 
the court made no reference to unjust enrichment, the company’s right to recover the 
mistaken payment is most readily explicable by the law’s intervention to reverse 
unjust enrichment. The widow was enriched through the receipt of the money. The 
enrichment was at the expense of the company, which paid her the money. The 
enrichment was unjust because the company’s decision to benefit the widow was 
vitiated by mistake. This prima facie right to restitution crystalised into an absolute 
one since the widow did not plead any defence. 
Let us now turn to causative responses, briefly defined as rights that arise from the 
happening of certain legally significant events. Whether a particular response is 
available in any given case depends on the causative event one is concerned with. One 
response that we are all familiar with is the granting of a right to compensation for 
loss. When we speak of damages, we usually mean compensatory damages. It is a 
loss-based response. Restitution, in contrast, operates to reverse or undo the 
defendant’s enrichment. It is a gain-based response, and includes both ‘giving back’ 
and ‘giving up’.153  
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the defendant. Mrs Solari was indeed a total honest and innocent claimant, but it made no difference’. 
The existence of fault, however, would affect the availability of certain defences, eg bona fide change 
of position and bona fide purchase for value. 
153 Birks, Unjust Enrichment, at pp 281–82; Peter BH Birks, ‘A Letter to America: The New 
Restatement of Restitution’ (2003) 3(2) Global Jurist Frontiers, article 2, at pp 5–10. 
 Unjust enrichment entitles the plaintiff to restitution.154 Importantly, restitution is the 
only response to unjust enrichment. As Birks explained, ‘the measure of the plaintiff’s 
recovery is dictated by the causative event itself’.155 Therefore, where an action is 
based on unjust enrichment, any claim for compensation must be readily dismissed.  
Restitution, however, does not respond solely to unjust enrichment. Although the 
standard response to a wrong is compensation,156 it has been recognised that for 
certain wrongs, gain-based responses are available.157 The case of Attorney-General v 
Blake158 is a good example. The defendant, in breach of his employment contract with 
the state, wrote a memoir based on confidential information acquired in the course of 
the performance of his duties as a secret intelligence officer. The memoir was 
published and he received royalties from the publisher. The state suffered no 
quantifiable loss to be compensated. But the House of Lords held that it was entitled 
to damages assessed on the basis of the profits made by the defendant. Such gain-
based damages required the defendant to make restitution in the ‘giving up’ sense, 
since the profits were derived not from the state but from the publisher.159 Other 
wrongs which may trigger restitution include property torts (eg trespass and 
conversion)160 and breach of fiduciary duty.161 The multi-causality of restitution 
means that it is wider than unjust enrichment as a subject of study (see Part III below).   
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 There are several ways to effect restitution.162 It is only necessary here to explain 
briefly the distinction between personal and proprietary restitution. Where the 
plaintiff claims personal restitution, he is seeking to recover from the defendant the 
monetary value of the enrichment, which is assessed at the time of the defendant’s 
receipt of the enrichment. As this is not a claim for the thing that forms the 
enrichment, whether the thing is still with the defendant is irrelevant. On the other 
hand, where a plaintiff claims proprietary restitution, he is seeking to recover the 
thing itself or its traceable proceeds (ownership claim), or to enforce an equitable lien 
over the thing or its traceable substitute to secure a claim for personal restitution 
(security claim). The claim is not against a fixed person but rather against any person 
in whose hands the thing or its traceable substitute now lies. A proprietary claim is 
advantageous in the event of the defendant’s insolvency and where the value of the 
thing or its traceable substitute is higher than what the plaintiff is entitled to under 
personal restitution.  
While it is clear that unjust enrichment triggers personal restitution, the availability of 
proprietary restitution has been a matter of dispute. Most scholars accept that some 
cases of unjust enrichment trigger proprietary restitution.163 Virgo, however, sees 
proprietary restitution as exclusively a matter of property law.164 In his view, a 
plaintiff who claims proprietary restitution is seeking to vindicate his property right. 
This has nothing to do with unjust enrichment since the plaintiff is asserting ‘That is 
mine!’ as opposed to ‘You are enriched at my expense!’ This view has some judicial 
support.165 To properly assess this view, it is necessary to examine the concept of 
property and how it relates to the causative events. 
The word ‘property’ can be used as both an adjective and a noun. As an adjective, it 
describes a certain type of rights which relates to specific assets and is exigible 
against the world.166 Such rights are commonly referred to as property rights. These 
are to be contrasted with personal rights (eg contractual rights), which are exigible 
only against specific persons (eg the parties to the contract). The most important of 
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 property rights is legal ownership, which is the right to exclusive control of an asset. 
It imposes on the rest of the world a corresponding duty not to interfere with an 
owner’s control of his asset. An interesting issue is the extent to which a beneficiary’s 
interest in a trust asset approximates legal ownership. Unlike legal ownership, the 
beneficiary’s interest does not always relate to a physical thing. The trust asset could 
be a personal right, eg money in a bank account, which is essentially a contractual 
right to demand payment (only) from the bank. Therefore, the beneficiary’s interest is 
best seen as relating to whatever right, whether property or personal, the trustee is 
holding for him. Like legal ownership, the beneficiary’s right to demand for the trust 
asset is exigible against the world. If a trust asset has fallen into the hands of a third 
party, the beneficiary is prima facie entitled to demand for its return. Also, the 
beneficiary’s interest is not affected by the insolvency of the person holding the trust 
asset.167 For these reasons, a beneficiary’s right to the trust asset is generally accepted 
as part of the property law system.168 We shall refer to it as equitable ownership and 
treat it as a form of property right.  
As a noun, ‘property’ refers to the asset to which property rights could attach. We 
have already noted the difference between legal and equitable ownership in this 
respect. The traditional view is that, with a few exceptions, legal ownership only 
attaches to physical things.169 But this has not gone unchallenged. In OBG Ltd v 
Allan,170 for example, Baroness Hale (minority) gave a broad definition of property: 
‘The essential feature of property is that it has an existence independent of a particular 
person: it can be bought and sold, given and received, bequeathed and inherited, 
pledged or seized to secure debts, acquired (in the olden days) by a husband on 
marrying its owner’.171 If this view is accepted, then, in principle, property rights 
could attach to intangible assets, which mostly consists of personal rights (eg choses 
in action). We shall return to see why this is important. 
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 For now, let us focus on property in the first sense. Birks was correct to point out that 
we are dealing with rights, which belong in the response plane.172 It is a categorical 
error to present property and unjust enrichment as mutually exclusive categories since 
they belong in different planes. Property rights could be acquired through a number of 
events.173 Suppose that I purchased a book from a bookstore and gave it to you as a 
birthday present. You then declared a trust of the book for your friend. The legal 
ownership in the book was created when the book was manufactured, which falls 
within the category of ‘other events’.174 I then acquired it through a contract of sale 
entered into with the bookstore. You subsequently acquired the same by me making a 
gift to you. Lastly, when you declared a trust of the book, your friend acquired a new 
equitable ownership in the book. The last three instances belong within the category 
of ‘consent’.  
The commission of a wrong may also create new property rights. In Attorney-General 
for Hong Kong v Reid,175 the fiduciary accepted bribes and used them to purchase a 
number of real properties. The Privy Council held that the fiduciary held the 
properties on a constructive trust for the principal. The principal’s equitable 
ownership in the properties arose for the first time when the constructive trust was 
imposed, which was in response to the defendant’s breach of a fiduciary duty. Even 
Virgo concedes that in this case there is an overlap between property law and the law 
of wrongs, and it is preferable to treat the claim as founded on a wrong ‘since it is the 
wrong which triggers the recognition of the claimant’s proprietary right’.176   
If property rights could arise from consent, wrong and other events, there is no logical 
reason to deny the same from arising from unjust enrichment. In Chase Manhattan 
Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd,177 the court held that the mistaken payee 
was to hold the money on a trust for the mistaken payor. Since mistake does not 
prevent legal ownership in the money from passing, the mistaken payor’s claim 
cannot be based on any pre-existing legal ownership in the money.178 Instead, a new 
equitable ownership in the money was created in response to unjust enrichment. 
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 While one may argue about whether unjust enrichment should generate property 
rights, any conclusion must be a matter of choice, not logic.179 If it is accepted that 
unjust enrichment does generate property rights, the question of when they should 
arise must equally be a matter of choice informed by relevant principles and policies.  
Once property rights are created, how they are protected is a different matter.180 
Consider a simple case where I dropped my watch and you happened to pick it up. 
Although I retain legal ownership in the watch,181 I am, traditionally, not entitled to 
claim the return of the watch by virtue of my legal ownership. The law does not 
recognise a claim that corresponds to the assertion ‘That watch is mine!’ Instead, my 
legal ownership in the watch is protected indirectly through other branches of the law. 
If you refuse to return my watch, you would have committed the torts of conversion 
and detinue.182 Although the court has the power to order the return of my watch,183 
the standard remedy is compensation.184 Conversion and detinue, however, do not lie 
for the interference of intangible assets.185 The best example is money in a bank 
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 account, which is, in essence, a contractual debt owed by the bank to the account 
holder. For such cases, unjust enrichment plugs the gap.186 If you somehow managed 
to withdraw money from my bank account, the transfer of value represents your 
enrichment at my expense. The unjust factor is lack of consent.187 Both examples 
show that the protection of legal ownership is not exclusively a matter of property 
law. Legal ownership is protected indirectly through the other branches of the law. 
However, there is nothing to prevent a legal system from enforcing property rights 
directly. The law may respond by saying ‘That watch is yours!’ This is best reflected 
by how equitable ownership is protected. Where a trust asset is disposed of without 
authority, the beneficiary could do more than to sue the trustee for breach of trust. He 
has a direct claim for the return of the trust asset against anyone (except an ‘Equity’s 
darling’)188 in whose hands the trust asset now lies.189 There are indications that the 
common law is slowly moving in this direction, at least in the protection of intangible 
assets.190 This, of course, must be premised on the law’s recognition that property 
rights could attach to such assets in the first place, lending support to the wider 
conception of property as a noun.191 As noted earlier, Virgo sees such claims as a 
matter of property law. The plaintiff is asserting his ownership rather than claiming 
unjust enrichment. This is convincing. The curious question that remains is what 
event do such claims respond to? Virgo, having admitted that the principle of 
vindication of property right is not an event, went on to say: ‘the event could be that 
the defendant has interfered with the claimant’s property rights in some way’.192 It is 
interesting to note that the same event also gives rise to actions in conversion and 
detinue, which belong in the event of wrongs. However, as the plaintiff who seeks to 
vindicate his property right need not specifically plead a breach of duty, it is best not 
to regard the causative event as a wrong. If we insist on identifying an event within 
the Birksian grid on which the plaintiff’s claim is based, it is the event through which 
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 he has acquired his property right. He is seeking the direct enforcement of this 
primary right. 
Although Birks appeared to accept that a claim based on pre-existing ownership is a 
matter of property law, he continued to dispute the role of property law where the 
plaintiff is seeking to recover a new asset as substitute for the original. In Foskett v 
McKeown,193 the beneficiaries succeeded in tracing trust money into a substitute asset 
and claiming a proportionate share in it. The majority of the judges held that the claim 
was based on vindication of property right.194 Birks disagreed on the basis that it is a 
misconception to regard the plaintiff’s equitable ownership in the original asset as 
capable of latching on to the substitute asset.195  The ownership of an asset cannot be 
detached from it. Instead, the equitable ownership in the substitute asset is newly 
created in response to unjust enrichment. This objection could be rebutted. As Low 
explains, ‘the nature and extent of property rights is determined by the particular legal 
system and it is not illogical for the common law to decide that property rights are to 
be protected to the extent that an original owner will be able to reach through the 
original thing to its substitutes’.196 Property law may decide to enforce the plaintiff’s 
ownership by allowing him to claim a substitute asset as his.197 It is not necessary to 
resort to unjust enrichment. 
The causative events may also determine the available defences. For example, in 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd,198 where the House of Lords recognised that an unjust 
enrichment claim could be met by a change of position defence,199 Lord Goff said: 
‘the defence should not be open to a wrongdoer’.200 This has been interpreted to 
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 exclude the defence in cases of restitution for wrongs.201 Although this view has its 
supporters,202 it has also been argued that the defence should apply to strict liability 
wrongs where the defendant has not acted in bad faith, and so long as allowing the 
defence does not undermine the policy behind the law’s prohibition of such 
wrongs.203 This requires the policy behind the wrong in question to be independently 
considered.  
Finally, it is useful to note that a same set of facts could give rise to concurrent causes 
of action. A simple example would suffice.204 Where a defendant breached a contract 
by his failure to render any performance, the plaintiff may either (a) base his claim in 
contract and claim for compensatory damages, or (b) base his claim on unjust 
enrichment, specifically on the ground of (total) failure of consideration, and claim 
for restitution.205 Between the two concurrent alternative causes of action the plaintiff 
must choose one, but not both. The effects of the available responses on the plaintiff’s 
position will play a major role in his selection. Compensatory damages would place 
the plaintiff, as far as money can do, in the position as if the contract has been 
performed.206 This is beneficial if the plaintiff would have earned a profit from the 
performance of the contract. He would be compensated for his loss of profit. In 
contrast, restitution would place the plaintiff, as far as money can do, back in his 
original position prior to the contract. This would require the defendant to refund any 
benefit received from the plaintiff, eg a part payment. This is beneficial where the 
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 plaintiff has made a bad bargain and has nothing to gain from the performance of the 
contract.207 Besides the measure of recovery, other factors that may influence a 
plaintiff’s choice when faced with concurrent alternative causes of action include the 
availability of evidence, limitation period, defences and choice of law issues. 
 
PART III: TERMINOLOGY 
Only a handful of books published after the Restatement were written under the title 
of ‘quasi-contract’. 208  Goff and Jones affirmed the Restatement’s choice of 
‘restitution’ as the preferred title. An observant reader, however, would wonder why 
the choice was not ‘unjust enrichment’. It is, after all, the event that triggers 
restitution. It is strange to speak of the law of restitution for the same reason why we 
do not usually speak of the law of compensation.209 Even Seavey, one of the 
Reporters for the Restatement, admitted almost two decades later that ‘[p]erhaps 
unjust enrichment would be a better term’.210  
The main reason why unjust enrichment lost the titular honour was due to fear of 
uncertainty.211 In a letter dated 14 November 1770, a mysterious writer who used the 
pseudonym Junius complained to Lord Mansfield:   
Instead of those certain, positive rules, by which the judgment of a court of 
law should invariably be determined, you have fondly introduced your own 
unfettered notions of equity and substantial justice … In the mean time the 
practice gains ground; the court of King’s Bench becomes a court of equity, 
and the judge, instead of consulting strictly the law of the land, refers only to 
the wisdom of the court, and to the purity of his own conscience.212 
Another scholar commented even more bluntly: ‘Aequum et bonum! At the mention 
of this term, a shudder will pass through the frames of esteemed and learned 
friends’.213 The courts, too, became wary of abstract conceptions of justice and 
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 fairness. The history of quasi-contract, which was filled with Lord Mansfield’s 
reference to ‘aequo et bono’ as justifying the right to restitution, was described as a 
‘history of well-meaning sloppiness of thought’.214 Similarly, in Baylis v Bishop of 
London,215 Hamilton LJ said: 
To ask what course would be ex aequo et bono to both sides never was a very 
precise guide … Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago, we are not 
now free in the twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence which 
is sometimes attractively styled ‘justice as between man and man.’216 
‘Unjust enrichment’, if left undefined, is no less vague. When the final draft of the 
Restatement was approved in May 1936, the title remained Restatement of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment.217 ‘Unjust Enrichment’ was finally dropped from the title 
most likely because the ALI was concerned that it might be seen as ‘endorsing an 
open-ended charter of liability, to be invoked in any case where “enrichment” and 
“injustice” might be thought to coincide’.218  
Birks complained that neither the Restatement nor Goff and Jones did much to cure 
the worry: ‘They leave ‘unjust’ up in the sky, where it cannot do this necessary 
work’.219 When Birks published his book, however, the role and meaning of ‘unjust’ 
was already afforded careful treatment.220 He explained: 
‘Unjust’ … does not look up to an abstract notion of justice but down to the 
cases and statutes. It is merely a general word expressing the common quality 
of those factors which, when present in conjunction with enrichment, have 
been held to call for restitution. So there has to be a list of such factors and, if 
possible, the list should have some order to it. It should not be compiled at 
random.221  
Moreover, he was clearly aware that it was unjust enrichment, not restitution, which 
falls on the plane of causative events.222 Therefore, one would have expected him to 
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 name his book An Introduction to the Law of Unjust Enrichment. The reason for not 
doing so was this. At that time, he was of the view that ‘[r]estitution and unjust 
enrichment and restitution quadrate, naming the same area of law from different sides 
of the square’.223 In other words, ‘[w]hen there is unjust enrichment then there is 
restitution, and vice versa’.224 Since unjust enrichment and restitution both refer to the 
same area of the law, the more familiar term was adopted.  
The quadration, however, was achieved by forcing restitution for wrongs into the 
event of unjust enrichment using the label ‘unjust enrichment by wrongdoing’.225 This 
added to the existing category of ‘unjust enrichment by subtraction’,226 which is 


















What this does was to conceal the fact that two categories of ‘unjust enrichment’ are 
analytically different. For example, in deciding whether restitutionary damages is 
available for breach of contract, the essential questions are (a) whether there is a 
breach of contract, and (b) whether there is any reason or legitimate interest justifying 
an award other than on the basis of compensation.227 In contrast, a prima facie claim 
for restitution of unjust enrichment is made out upon answering the following 
questions in the affirmative: (a) was the defendant enriched? (b) was it at the 
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 plaintiff’s expense? and (c) was it unjust? It is obvious that the two courses of 
inquires do not correspond. Since unjust enrichment by wrongdoing is predicated 
upon a breach of duty, it is really a wrong-based event and should therefore be placed 
within the event of wrongs and not unjust enrichment. The quadrationist view was 
therefore incorrect. 
Birks subsequently had a change of heart. As he confessed, ‘[t]he truth is that the 
quadration of unjust enrichment and restitution is not naturally perfect’.228 He said:  
To say that every obligation arise from contract, wrong, restitution, or some 
other event is much like saying that animals are mammals, reptiles, birds, 
yellow, or of some other kind. The classification is bent. At yellow it turns a 
corner. It does not matter how often we tell ourselves that by ‘restitution’ in 
this context we actually mean ‘autonomous unjust enrichment’. Sooner or later 
people will be misled and will turn the unintended corner.229  
Modern textbooks now recognise the multi-causality of restitution. Some are 
dedicated to exploring restitution of unjust enrichment alone. Birks’ last book was 
entitled Unjust Enrichment. The latest (eighth) edition of Goff and Jones has been 
renamed The Law of Unjust Enrichment. The new authors explained: 
… we have decided to excise all discussion of restitution for wrongdoing, and 
to focus our attention exclusively on the subject with which this work has 
always been centrally concerned, namely the law of unjust enrichment and the 
remedies that it generates.230 
Other books held on to ‘restitution’ but made it clear that restitution is multi-causal.231 
They deal with both restitution of unjust enrichment and restitution for wrongs. The 
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 latter usually occupy a few chapters at the end. It is ultimately a matter of preference 
whether one deals with the wider law of restitution, which is multi-causal, or only 
with restitution of unjust enrichment. The advantages of taking the wider approach is 
nicely summarised by Virgo: 
There are a number of common principles and questions of policy which 
underlie all restitutionary claims regardless of the cause of action. So, for 
example, there are important questions of relevance to all restitutionary claims 
concerning how restitutionary remedies should be assessed. Similarly, there 
are defences and bars which are generally applicable to all restitutionary 
claims regardless of the principle on which that claim is founded. Also, as a 
mechanism for analysis of the law, the law of restitution remains a useful hook 
on which to hang disparate areas of law. It forces us to make connections 
which might otherwise be ignored and so the subject remains of great use for 
the purposes of exposition.232 
 
PART IV: LESSONS 
In Malaysia, a number of important unjust enrichment claims are set out in Part VI 
(sections 69–73) of the Contracts Act 1950 under the title ‘Of Certain Relations 
Resembling Those Created By Contract’. The forms of action received no mention 
since the Contracts Act 1950 postdated their abolishment. Although this provided the 
opportunity for a fresh start in approaching the subject, the courts have generally 
failed to capitalise on this opportunity. Legal progress is to some extent impeded by 
confusions arising from the failure to have regard to the historical backgrounds 
against which the statutory provisions in Part VI were enacted. Two examples will 
suffice. Both concern section 73 of the Contracts Act 1950, which states: ‘A person to 
whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, 
must repay or return it’.  
In AmBank (M) Bhd v KB Leisure (M) Sdn Bhd,233 a case about mistaken payments, 
the High Court held that section 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 only applies where 
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the mistaken payer and payee.234 
The court allegedly found support from the two statutory illustrations to the section, 
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 of which we shall only refer to the one concerning mistake.235 Illustration (a) states: 
‘A and B jointly owe RM100 to C. A alone pays the amount to C, and B, not knowing 
this fact, pays RM100 over again to C. C is bound to repay the amount to B’. It is 
possible that the illustration was drafted to reflect a liability mistake, ie the plaintiff 
was under an erroneous belief that he was liable to pay the defendant.236 But even the 
requirement of a liability mistake, which has since been abandoned in most modern 
jurisdictions, is not confined to a mistake as to contractual liability.237 The plaintiff 
could, for example, be mistaken about his liability to pay tax or a judgment debt. The 
court’s insistence on a contractual link must have stemmed from the misconception 
that section 73 is governed by contract principles. It is, after all, found in a contract 
statute. History, however, has informed us that any affinity between contract and 
unjust enrichment was purely a result of historical accidents. More importantly, 
contract and unjust enrichment are conceptually distinct. A mistaken payee does not 
contract to repay the mistaken payer. To regard him as having done so, when in fact 
he did not, is to subscribe to the fictitious implied contract theory, which has since 
been rejected by the Court of Appeal in Koh Siak Poo v Sayang Plantation Bhd.238 
For these reasons, this aspect of the court’s decision in AmBank must be regarded as 
incorrect.  
The other example is the continued references to the obsolete forms of action without 
understanding what they really mean. In the context of mistaken payments, the courts 
almost never fail to speak of the action for money had and received. It was often 
regarded as a wider claim based on the principle of unjust enrichment, separate from 
the statutory claim encapsulated in section 73, although the elements of an unjust 
enrichment claim have also been applied to section 73.239 As we have examined in 
Part I, the action for money had and received was only a procedural means by which 
the plaintiff enforces his claim. It was not a cause of action. The causative event that 
triggers the right to restitution is the plaintiff’s mistake in making the payment, which 
rendered the defendant’s enrichment unjust. This is now encapsulated in section 73 of 
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 the Contracts Act 1950.240 In overlooking these connections, the courts often end up 
explaining the claim for money had and received separately by resorting to broad and 
open-ended notions such as equity, conscience and natural justice. For example, in 
Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd v Hashbudin bin Hashim, the court so explained the basis of 
the duty to repay a mistaken payment: ‘[I]t is not right for the [defendant] to keep the 
money. He is bound by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money to 
the [plaintiff] … He would be unjustly enriched at the [plaintiff’s] expense if the 
[plaintiff] could not recover from him’.241 The court in Affin Bank Bhd v MMJ 
Exchange Sdn Bhd242 was closer to the mark when it observed that ‘if money was paid 
under a mistake, it would be against good conscience to retain that money’.243 
Unfortunately, the court went on to consider money had and received as a separate 
cause of action and made no reference to unjust enrichment.244 As to be expected, 
however, the courts always arrive at the same conclusion for these claims. While this 
means that no direct harm is caused, the incorrect distinction is clearly unnecessary 
and is liable to confuse. There is only one case, Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd v Siti 
Fatimah Mohd Zain, where the court rightly recognised the connections between 
section 73, money had and received, and unjust enrichment.245 To avoid confusion, 
we must discard the language of the old forms of action, which hinder rather than aid 
understanding. The emphasis should be on the precise identification of the grounds 
for restitution. 
There are also lessons to be learnt from Parts II and III. In many instances the courts 
invoked the phrase ‘unjust enrichment’ to explain responses that are best understood 
as triggered by other events. Such indiscriminate use of the term deprives the law of 
unjust enrichment of its established terminology and is likely to cause confusion. 
In Hsu Seng v Chai Soi Fua,246 the plaintiff was the assignee of an agreement to 
purchase a property made between a purchaser, who was the assignor, and the 
defendant vendor. The purchaser paid the vendor $72,000 as part payment of the 
purchase price of $120,000. The contract stated that if the vendor fails to obtain the 
property’s document of title by a specified date, he shall be allowed a further period 
of six months to do so, during which he shall pay the purchaser $1,000 per month as 
liquidated damages. It also stipulated that if the vendor fails to obtain the said 
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 document after the time extension, he shall pay $72,000 to the purchaser as liquidated 
damages. The defendant failed to perform his obligations within the specified 
deadlines and the plaintiff claimed for liquidated damages amounting to $78,000. The 
court found in the plaintiff’s favour and explained the right to recover the part 
payment as based on the vendor’s unjust enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense. This is 
incorrect. In the English case of The Trident Beauty,247 the charterer of a vessel, upon 
the termination of the charterparty for the ship-owner’s breach of contract, sought to 
recover an overpayment of hire from the assignee of the ship-owner’s right to 
receivables. As the charterparty contained a clause which required any overpaid hire 
to be returned, the charterer’s claim for restitution based on the ground of total failure 
of consideration was rejected. As Lord Goff explained, ‘the existence of the agreed 
regime renders the imposition by the law of a remedy in restitution both unnecessary 
and inappropriate’.248 Likewise, in the present case, the agreed liquidated damages 
clauses ousted any unjust enrichment claim. The right to recover the part payment and 
damages for the delay were derived from the contractual terms. The causative event is 
the parties’ consent and not unjust enrichment.  
In Koh Siew Keng (P) v Koh Heng Jin,249 a father opened a bank account to be held 
jointly by him and his two sons. He deposited money into the account, intending it to 
be shared equally between them. The father and one of the sons died shortly after, and 
the surviving son withdrew the money for himself. His mother, who was the residuary 
legatee under the father’s will, claimed that the surviving son held one third of the 
money on trust for her. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that there was a 
trust (and hence no breach of trust) but held that the mother was entitled to recover 
the money based on unjust enrichment. It is submitted that the decision is better 
justified on other grounds. The money in the bank account was in the form of a chose 
in action, specifically a debt owed by the bank to the account holders. As there cannot 
be a tenancy in common of a chose in action at law, the agreement to share the money 
equally could only be given effect to in equity.250 The account holders must be taken 
to have agreed to hold the money on trust for each other, each entitled to one-third 
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 share.251 When two of them died, the surviving son became the sole trustee and 
continued to hold the money on trust, now for the estates of the deceased. When he 
withdrew the money for himself, the mother could bring a number of claims.252 First, 
if the money is still with the son, she may trace her equitable ownership in one-third 
share of the debt into the money and assert her equitable ownership over it.253 Her 
claim is to vindicate her equitable ownership, which was created by the trust and 
passed on to her under her husband’s will. Second, if the money was no longer with 
the son, she may bring a substitutive performance claim, requiring him to restore the 
trust fund with his own money as a substitute for the original trust asset.254 This is not 
a wrong-based claim but rather one to enforce the performance of the trustee’s duties 
to hold and deliver trust property on demand, which arose from the trust. 255 
Alternatively, she may bring a reparation claim for the compensation of any loss 
suffered by the trust fund as a result of the son’s breach of trust. This is a wrong-
based claim.256 None of these are unjust enrichment claims.257 
There were also instances where the courts explained the remedy of account of profits 
for breach of fiduciary duty as based on the prevention of unjust enrichment.258 
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 Although the remedy of account of profits is restitutionary (in the ‘giving up’ sense), 
it is in response to a wrong, specifically the breach of the (primary) fiduciary duty. 
In another case, the court sought to characterise liability for knowing receipt as based 
on unjust enrichment.259 An action for knowing receipt is based on the allegation that 
the defendant had received an asset traceable to a prior breach of fiduciary duty in 
such situation where it was unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the 
receipt.260 The element of unconscionability is largely determined by reference to the 
plaintiff’s knowledge regarding the breach of fiduciary duty. Since the liability for 
knowing receipt depends on fault, it is inconsistent with liability for unjust 
enrichment, which is strict.261 Although the cases have not explicitly said so, liability 
for knowing receipt is better regarded as wrong-based.262 Whether a concurrent claim 
in unjust enrichment exists is a separate question.263 
 
PART V: FUTURE 
A comprehensive account of the law of unjust enrichment would require an entire 
book. The purpose of this article is more modest. It is intended to serve as a 
foundation upon which further works could be built. While these must be undertaken 
elsewhere, a few things could be said about the themes that should underlie them. 
Clearly, the emphasis should be on developing the substantive content of the subject.  
A particularly interesting project is to examine how we could use the common law by 
analogy to develop the contents of the provisions in Part VI of the Contracts Act 
1950. As Burrows opined, ‘using the common law to interpret a statute should be 
positively encouraged not merely because this enhances consistency between 
common law and statute but also because the common law has been carefully crafted 
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 and is likely to be both principled and practically workable’.264 In most other 
Commonwealth countries, the law of unjust enrichment exists mainly in the common 
law. Even in Malaysia, the courts were willing to venture beyond Part VI of the 
Contracts Act 1950. This is best evidenced by the recognition of total failure of 
consideration as a ground for restitution.265 Also, in a recent case,266 the court 
implicitly accepted the Woolwich principle, which allowed restitution in the case of 
ultra vires levy of tax by a public body.267 These common law developments supply a 
wealth of materials from which guidance could be drawn in interpreting the 
provisions in Part VI of the Contracts Act 1950. The aim is to promote a principled 
approach in the application of the statutory provisions and to ensure consistency and 
coherence in the general law of unjust enrichment.  
The Malaysian courts are generally receptive to this suggestion, as evidenced by their 
treatment of sections 70, 71 and 73 of the Contracts Act 1950.268  They have 
purportedly applied the standard common law inquiry by asking: (a) is the defendant 
enriched? (b) is it at the plaintiff’s expense? and (c) is it unjust? Unfortunately, 
however, the courts have sometimes approached this course of inquiry in a broad-
brush manner. This is most apparent from the courts’ treatment of the ‘unjust’ inquiry, 
as seen in Part IV. Ingredients (a) and (b) of the claim were also sometimes 
misunderstood, overlooked or left unaddressed. A couple of examples would suffice. 
In relation to ingredient (a), there is a tendency to speak of the defendant’s retention 
of the enrichment.269 However, when considering whether the plaintiff has a prima 
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 facie entitlement to restitution, the true focus is on the defendant’s receipt of the 
enrichment, not its retention.270 Section 73 of the Contracts Act 1950, for example, 
requires only that the defendant be a person ‘to whom money has been paid’. In 
relation to ingredient (b), there is generally a failure to appreciate the complexities 
that may arise from cases involving multiple parties. For example, if A enters into a 
contract with B under which A is required to confer a benefit on C, which A did, can 
we say that C is enriched at A’s expense?271 The question of whether A could 
leapfrog B to recover from C becomes important where B is no longer to be found, is 
not worth suing, or is protected by a defence. While the wording of section 73 does 
not reveal any hostility against leapfrogging, the common law holds a firm view 
against leapfrogging in such a situation. Although it was A who conferred the benefit 
on C, A was merely fulfilling a contractual obligation owed to B. As it was B, not A, 
who bought the benefit for C, C is enriched at B’s expense and not at A’s.272 
To be commended, however, is the willingness of the Malaysian courts to import 
common law defences to exclude or limit a claim for restitution based on a provision 
in Part VI of the Contracts Act 1950 (specifically section 73) even though these were 
not expressly provided for in the statute.273 This will enable a more generous 
approach to be taken towards the ingredients of the claim (ie elements (a) to (c)) since 
the defences would serve as counterbalances.274 However, it is important to be 
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 reminded that the defences are not discretionary but are instead governed by 
principles. As Lord Goff emphasised in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd,275 ‘where 
recovery is denied, it is denied on the basis of legal principle’.276 Having recognised 
the availability of restitutionary defences, the focus should shift to working out their 
detailed rules and principles to ensure that competing interests are properly balanced. 
It is only through a committed effort to address all these could we truly claim to have 
a well-developed law of unjust enrichment. The courts must translate their enthusiasm 
for the subject into approaching it in a principled manner, which will enable them to 
identify clearly the problems and then address them with coherent solutions. 
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